We extend the trade restrictiveness index approach to the case of market imperfections and domestic regulations addressing them. We focus on standard-like non-tariff measures (NTMs) affecting cost of production and potentially enhancing demand by increasing product quality or reducing negative externalities. We apply the framework to the database of Kee et al. (2009) and derive ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) for NTMs. Half of the product lines affected by NTMs exhibit negative AVEs, indicating a net trade-facilitating effect of NTMs. Accounting for these effects significantly reduces previous measures of countries' trade policy restrictiveness obtained while constraining NTMs to be trade reducing.
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Introduction
Standard-like non-tariff measures (NTMs) are playing an increasing role in international trade.
Some of them have protectionist purposes, especially in a context of decreasing tariff barriers.
However, some others are adopted by policymakers to address market imperfections (externalities, information asymmetries). In such cases, NTMs may be trade facilitating and welfare enhancing. The literature measuring the restrictiveness of the trade policy, through the computation of various indices, has failed to consider these effects. Our paper fills this gap.
With global sourcing, it becomes challenging to guarantee products' safety and quality and to mitigate negative externalities. Standards and regulations affecting quality help overcome asymmetric information issues. Occasional recalls by toy, pharmaceutical and food companies illustrate the importance of various safety concerns, such as led paints in children toys (Lipton and Barboza, 2007) . Consumers may also care about global commons and avoid purchasing products obtained using unsustainable environmental practices. To preserve their reputation, large firms (e.g. Home Depot, IKEA, etc.) have shown strong support for forest certification (McDermott and Cashore, 2009) . Similarly, consumer welfare is improved by quality requirements limiting residues of dangerous pesticides and antibiotics in food products (Disdier and Marette, 2010) .
In this context, regulatory interventions have strong economic and political support, despite risks of inefficiency and distortions. The effects of these regulatory instruments are indeed complex not only because instruments are imperfect but also because they impact costs of heterogeneous foreign and domestic producers. Meeting the NTMs is costly for both domestic and foreign suppliers and often more so for the latter. While a regulation may thwart a market failure and facilitate trade between countries, it may also reduce market access for foreign 2 producers who cannot easily comply with this regulation. To illustrate, between October 2006 and 2007, the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) announced 473 products recalls of which 389 cases involved imported products (CPSC, 2008) . This last effect may outweigh the "legitimate action" to mitigate a market failure. Both trade and welfare impacts of regulation are ambiguous and in general hard to evaluate. A rigorous empirical measure of these trade and welfare impacts therefore requires a consistent framework, as proposed here.
We consider a small open economy, distorted, first, by arbitrary tariffs and other domestic price policy distortions, and second by market imperfections and existing NTMs allegedly addressing them. We pay particular attention to NTMs and their protective effects against import competing products, as well as their potential demand enhancing effects when NTMs reduce information asymmetries and trade cost. We then extend the trade restrictiveness index (TRI) approach of Anderson and Neary (2005) to this more general and realistic case encompassing market failures and the existing domestic regulations addressing them.
The TRI approach of Anderson and Neary (1992 , 1994 , 1996 , 2003 , and 2005 ) provides a welfare-based consistent aggregation of various trade distortions into a scalar uniform surtax factor, equivalent to these distortions in terms of their welfare effects. The TRI approach is a concept applying to a whole economy because it relies on the balance of trade approach.
Nevertheless, it has been applied successfully to partial equilibrium and multi-market situations. Feenstra (1995) has proposed some simplifying assumptions greatly fostering the applicability of the approach by reducing the number of price responses to estimate or calibrate in the implementation. The TRI and its extensions such as the Mercantilist TRI (MTRI) of Anderson and Neary (2003) have been used to derive the tariff equivalent of arbitrary tariff structures (Anderson and Neary, 1994) , tariffs and quotas Neary, 1992 and 2005) , tariffs 3 and domestic production subsidies (Anderson et al., 1995; Anderson and Neary, 2005; Beghin et al., 2003) , and tariffs and AVEs of other NTMs (Hoekman and Nicita, 2011; Kee et al., 2009; Lloyd and MacLaren, 2008; and Bratt, 2012) , among others. As shown in these applications, the TRI approach provides a consistent aggregation of distortionary effects of various policy instruments into a single "total" AVE within a given sector. The latter property explains the recent success and popularity of the approach in empirical investigations of NTMs in presence of tariffs and other price policies at the sector level.
The novelty of the present paper is to allow for market imperfections and trade facilitating effects of NTMs in the TRI framework. Despite its inherent ability to capture secondbest situations, the determination of the TRI under market failure has been overlooked in the trade literature. The only related effort in this direction is from Chau et al. (2007) who develop a quantity-based distance function, a trade restrictiveness quantity index, in presence of environmental externalities but abstracting from existing policy interventions. Outside of the TRI literature, recent empirical investigations note that NTM regimes can facilitate trade (see Cadot and Gourdon, 2013 , for a review). Reputation and certification processes increase trust in exchange (Blind et al., 2013) ; quality standards help reputation and reputation loss can be detrimental to trade (Jouanjean, 2012) ; and transparency provisions in trade agreements can facilitate regulated trade flows (Lejárraga et al., 2013) .
We fill this gap in the TRI-related trade literature: we consider the TRI of arbitrary tariffs, domestic production subsidies, and NTMs in presence of possible external effects.
1 This undertaking is a substantive step forward for two reasons. First, trade policy reforms often occur in the context of market imperfections such as asymmetric information or negative externalities 1 Several investigations using the standard gravity equation approach find some trade facilitating effects of NTMs but without a rationalization based on some demand increasing effect or market imperfection presumably mitigated by the NTMs being analyzed (see Li and Beghin, 2012) .
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imposed on some agents. Accounting for these imperfections is relevant and has been the central pillar of the trade and environment literature using the dual approach to trade (Copeland, 1994; and Beghin et al., 1997) . Surprisingly, this case has eluded the TRI literature. Second, numerous
NTMs have been emerging in the last 15 years for several reasons, including potential protectionism, but also to address consumer and retailer concerns for health and the environment and associated external effects. A priori, excluding potential market imperfections when analyzing NTM policy reforms biases results and could lead to erroneous policy recommendations. Not surprisingly, sectoral AVEs and TRI estimates are likely to exhibit upward bias when they are econometrically constrained to treat all policies as trade-reducing. We depart from this restrictive premise and start from an agnostic prior on the impact of NTM policies on trade and welfare.
We then apply the proposed framework to the NTM global database of Kee et al. (2009) consisting of a large cross section of products (at the HS6 line level) and importing countries.
We derive ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) for NTMs and other policy distortions (tariffs and domestic production subsidies). 20% of Harmonized System (HS) 6-digit lines are affected by NTMs and nearly half of these (10% of the lines) exhibit negative AVEs of NTMs, indicating a net trade-facilitating effect of NTMs in those sectors. These AVEs are then used to evaluate the restrictiveness of the trade policy defined by countries. TRIs computed with these NTM AVEs reflect the frequent trade facilitating effect of NTMs. Accounting for these trade-facilitating effects significantly reduces previous measures of trade policy restrictiveness for most countries obtained while forcing NTMs to be trade reducing. These trade-facilitating effects cast doubt on the predominant presumption that NTMs are exclusively protectionist and cannot possibly boost trade, let alone welfare.
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Our paper proceeds as follows. We present the framework in Section 2. We then describe the data and detail the econometric approach in Section 3. Section 4 presents the estimation results of AVEs and TRIs. We conclude in Section 5.
The TRI framework with market imperfection
We follow the standard TRI approach with the balance of trade function derived from the dual approach to trade for a small open distorted economy. We build on the usual framework with a negative externality affecting the representative consumer as in Copeland (1994) . The externality is assumed exogenous to the consumer but influenced by the policymaker via some NTM regulations such as standard-like regulations. These regulations may not be set optimally and may be set at a protectionist level as in Fisher and Serra (2000) .
Market demand and supply, and balance of trade function
The utility of the representative consumer is u(x,H(NTM)) with non negative market goods x and negative externality H influenced by a vector of NTM policies, NTM, and with the usual definitions and properties 2 :
. 0 / with ) (
All domestic consumer prices p are inclusive of the exogenous world price wp, a tariff τ, and the unit cost equivalent of the domestic NTM on foreign suppliers to sell in the domestic market, or p = wp + τ + t(NTM).
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Given domestic prices p, the associated expenditure function is:
2 We could complicate the model by assuming that imports m influence the health externality or H(m(NTM), NTM). This would make health depends on all the arguments influencing imports and generate clutter with multiple feedback effects of all policies through health. The effect of NTM alone on health generates the possibility of trade enhancements which is what we are after. 3 Domestic and foreign firms have heterogeneous cost of meeting the NTM standard as explained later in the production component of the model and we assume that domestic firms are more efficient at meeting these NTMs. H of the negative externality is positive for any given utility level. To keep utility constant, expenditure has to increase when the negative externality increases. Partial derivative e u is the inverse of the marginal utility of income assumed positive. We eventually simplify preferences to follow Feenstra (1995) in the empirical investigation section.
The impact of the NTM policy encompasses several possible cases. The demand enhancing case is e pNTM = e pH H NTM < 0. Protectionism of the NTM is implied by H NTM = 0 because the policy does not address an externality or is not based on science. Another special case could be that the NTM policy affects H (H ntm <0) but that H(NTM) does not affect a particular demand (particular good n) directly, or e p n H = 0. In this case, the policy is not protectionist per se but addressing the market imperfection has no bearing on that particular demand for good n. These last two cases show the difficulty to gauge revealed protectionism. 4 For integrability of the Hicksian demands into the expenditure function, at least one of the demands represented by x has to be influenced by the external effect H. To illustrate, H could be the negative health effect of consuming products that are hazardous if minimum quality standards are not imposed on their production. The standard reduces the occurrence of sickness which may affect the demand for these products, and possibly other demands via better health 7 (reduced medical expenditure, more active leisure activities) or none other at all (all other demands independent of health status). Similar examples can be constructed with environmental external effects such as global commons or consumer packaging waste in retail consumption.
On the production side, domestic supply decisions in competitive industries are derived from the gdp function: 
Trade restrictiveness indices with externality
The TRI problem in our case is to find a scalar T equivalent to standard-like policies, tariffs, and production subsidies to apply as a tariff surcharge on world prices such that:
.
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The tariff surcharge accounts for several components: tariffs τ, domestic production subsidies s, the demand shift via H(NTM), and the protective effect from raising foreign cost to satisfy technical measure NTM, that is, t(NTM).
Next, while holding u constant, we differentiate equation (2) with respect to T, τ, s, and NTM to derive the relative change in T rather than T as it is customarily done in the TRI literature. This step yields:
with subscripts denoting the variable involved in the partial derivative of B. Solving for dT yields: 
with partial derivatives B i : We recover TRI T from dT as in Feenstra (1995) and Kee et al. (2009) , which is equivalent to the initial tariffs, subsidies, and NTMs relative to a world with all policies set to 0 by integrating both sides of (4) with respect to T going from zero to T and policies going from (0,0,0) to (τ, s, NTM). The latter approach works only if dT is non-negative. This step yields:
whose sign is undetermined. The original formula in Feenstra (1995) contains the first positive element from tariffs abstracting from s and NTM.
Here, two additional components originate from production subsidies ( This additional effect included in our equation (5) can potentially facilitate trade and complicates the simple narrative of obstructive NTM policies and their tax equivalent. Equation (5) is in essence the square root of a weighted sum of deadweight losses from tariff, production subsidies, and the welfare effects of NTMs. If the latter is a pure protectionist policy, then B H H NTM is zero (no demand shift) and the dead weight loss from the tariff equivalent t(NTM) is added to the sum of deadweight losses. If the NTM policy facilitates trade, then the latter maps into a welfare gain.
Removing the NTM decreases the TRI as welfare falls with its removal. If the latter effect dominates the distortionary effect of tariffs and subsidies, then dT is negative and T cannot be 11 recovered using (5). Instead, dT is the form of choice as in the early TRI investigations (e.g., Anderson et al., 1995) .
These effects are illustrated in partial equilibrium in Figure 1 . Figure 1 shows the two effects of the NTM policies, that is, the demand enhancement shift (from x to x' with greater utility achieved with reduced health hazard), and the increase in border price (wp+t(NTM)+τ)
reflecting the international cost of meeting the country's standard and the tariff, and their total effects on imports m. In previous investigations only the border price effect of NTM, t(NTM), was considered and the trade (and welfare) impact of NTM on imports was detrimental by assumption.
Insert Figure 1 here
Along with the TRI, we consider the MTRI, which holds aggregate imports (wp'm)
constant. The MTRI yields the tariff equivalent to all distortions holding aggregate trade unchanged but allowing for welfare variation. The MTRI is derived in Anderson and Neary (2003) and Kee et al. (2009) who call it the overall TRI (OTRI). The derivation of the MTRI follows the spirit of the derivation of the TRI and we only present its final formula in equation (12). We refer readers to Anderson and Neary (2003) for details.
An important consequence from the potential presence of trade-enhancement effects and negative AVEs from NTMs is that our TRI and MTRI estimates will be equal or smaller than the TRI and MTRI where all policies are constrained to be trade reducing. We discuss this important point in the empirical section.
The import equation to estimate
Next, we derive the import equation to estimate and the AVEs of all policy instruments. Totally differentiation of m (holding u constant) for changes in exogenous variables leads to a change in imports of good n in any country equal to:
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Equation (6) and m provide a way to estimate the response of imports to tariffs, subsidies, and NTM policies, and other variables as in Feenstra (1995) . We then derive the estimate of the AVE to the net effect of NTM policies on good n. Unfortunately we cannot separately identify the individual effects of NTM on m in (6), but we can estimate their net effect. Following a common practice we move the tariff effect on the left hand side of (6) and the general specification for the import demand of good n in country c (as indicated by superscript n,c) is:
Elasticity  n,c is the own-price response of import of good n in country c. ,
 is the sum of two AVE components (the tariff equivalent of NTM on world prices, and the ambiguous import subsidy/tax effect of NTM via decreased externality). Note that the latter AVE component is bound to the left to -100% as prices are non-negative. This non-negative constraint provides a lower bound of -100% on c n NTM ,  if we further assume that there is no trade impediment effect of the NTM policy (t(NTM)=0) at the border. This is a limit case to establish the lowest nonnegative prices faced by agents in the economy.
Equation (7) once estimated provides the basis for the total AVE of NTM policies on
, which is:
,, / , with 1 .
An AVE is developed similarly for production subsidies, based on the fact that
Unfortunately, parameter γ is not readily known as we only have estimates of import demand price elasticities and not the underlying output and demand price responses. Hence, we estimate a lower bound to the production subsidy AVE by abstracting from fraction (1-γ). Alternatively, the production subsidy AVE estimate could be seen as a market price support subsidy, affecting both consumer and producer prices. This assumption is common although not fully accurate.
Next, we specify ,
 as a transformation of an exponential such that it satisfies a lower bound on the total AVE of the NTM effects as before and in addition allowing for fixed effects per commodity and interaction terms with country-specific exogenous shifters (endowments) z.
For a continuous NTM variable, this leads to 
The lower bound condition in (9) is slightly more cumbersome with a dichotomous NTM.
The intuition is that . As production subsidy s is positive, presumably its AVE would not lead to negative producer price issues.
The total AVE of all distortions, that is, tariffs, NTMs, and subsidies for good n in country c is then (assuming the normalization wp=1): 
The TRI in equation (5) translates into: 
Again, if (4) gives a negative dT, then (11) cannot be used and the change in TRI, dT, is kept to express the change in the index equivalent to the welfare impact of the policy interventions. Recall that dT is expressed as a sum of consumer welfare changes, and that T is the square root of a positive sum of deadweight losses.
As noted above, we use the same data and AVE estimates to compute the MTRI, 
Data and econometric specification
We use the UNCTAD 7 -Comtrade database of Kee et al. (2009) 8 as well as their import demand 15 estimates (Kee et al., 2008) to estimate the import demand equation (7), recover AVEs (equations (9) and (10)) at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS), and compute the MTRI and TRI, (and dTRI) equivalents to the three types of distortions (tariffs, NTMs and subsidies) as in equations (11) and (12) (or (4) for negative dTRI) for each country.
Data
Trade data come from the Comtrade database. We use the average of imports at the HS 6-digit Countries' characteristics are measured by the economic size (gross domestic product -GDP), and relative factor endowments (agricultural land over GDP, capital over GDP, and labor over GDP). Data are extracted from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Two geographical variables are also introduced: a dummy for islands and a measure of remoteness (average distance to world markets defined as the import-weighted distance to each trading partner). Our sample includes 93 importing countries and 4,941 products (HS6 lines).
Econometric specification
We run estimations HS 6-digit line by HS 6-digit line. To control for the potential endogeneity of NTMs and production subsidies, we instrument them using exports, GDP-weighted average of the NTM dummy variable at the HS 6-digit of the 5 closest neighbors (in terms of geographic distance) and the GDP-weighted average of the agricultural domestic support at the HS 6-digit of the 5 closest neighboring economies (Kee et al., 2009 The quantity impact of NTMs and production subsidies is then transformed into priceequivalents (AVEs) using the provided import demand elasticities. AVEs are calculated for each importing country and HS6 line. We impose a positive cap AVEs at 50 for a few extreme values.
To ease result interpretation, we compute the mean over all importing countries at the HS6 and HS2 levels. Following our estimation, 10% of AVEs for NTMs at the HS 6-digit level are negative, i.e., highlighting trade-facilitating NTMs. Without constraint on the sign of the AVEs, our procedure allows us to keep these negative values in our sample. AVEs of NTMs, tariffs and production subsidies are then aggregated at the country level to derive the trade restrictiveness indices corresponding to all three types of policy interventions.
Finally, we use bootstrapping to compute the standard deviations of the AVEs. The main advantage of this procedure is to account for sampling and estimation errors of the AVEs. We draw (with repetition) 200 random samples from our dataset and perform the AVEs estimation for each of these samples. Estimations are run HS6 line by HS6 line. We then compute the bootstrap standard errors as the standard deviations of these 200 AVEs.
Results
We first present the results on AVEs of NTMs in the presence of externalities. We also provide comparisons with the AVEs obtained when the latter are constrained to be trade reducing.
AVEs of NTMs
We focus the discussion on the results obtained for the first 20 HS sections. 9 Qualitative conclusions are unchanged if the discussion of results is performed at the HS 2-digit level (with 96 sectors, see Table A .1 of the Online Appendix attached for review). Table 1 first reports the simple frequency ratio of NTMs for each HS section, i.e., the share of HS6 lines within each HS section for which at least one importing country of our sample imposes at least one NTM. The frequency ratio of NTMs should be interpreted as follows: for section I "live animals, animal products", the value 0.458 means that 45.8% of HS6 lines included in HS section I are affected by at least one NTM in at least one importing country.
Results suggest that agricultural and food products (sections I through IV) are more affected by NTMs than manufactured products. The frequency ratio is indeed larger for these products. These industries have high numbers of countries' notifications of sanitary and phytosanitary measures to the WTO. According to the results presented in the Appendix (Table   A .1), for some HS 2-digit sectors, such as live animals, meat, dairy products, edible fruit and nuts, more than half of the HS6 lines are subject to at least one NTM in one importing country.
By contrast, for a number of manufactured products, the share of HS6 lines impacted by a NTM is lower to much lower. A strong exception is "pharmaceutical products (HS30)" (frequency ratio of 52.7%). Many chemical and allied industries (section VI) have frequencies between 15 and 30%. Interestingly, textiles and apparel (section XI) and footwear and headgear (section XII)
for which the competition between Northern and Southern countries has been historically contentious, are subject to many NTMs suggesting that some of them may protectionist measures.
The next column of Table 1 reports the average AVE of NTMs for each HS section allowing for the presence of externalities. The mean is computed over all importing countries and HS6 lines within each section. The mean AVE on the whole sample is equal to 0.035, but strong differences can be observed across sections. First, the magnitude of the mean AVE varies significantly across sectors and is much higher for agricultural products and footwear/headgear than for other products. Second, almost all sections exhibit a positive average AVE, indicating that NTMs have, on average, a net negative impact on trade flows. However, for three sections (chemicals and allied industries, pearls and precious metals and stones, and arms and ammunition), the average AVE is negative, suggesting that NTMs are trade-facilitating either by improving quality, reducing information asymmetries or by being anti-protectionist. Not accounting for these positive trade effects will therefore bias the computation of AVEs, TRIs, and MTRIs. In our sample, 20% of HS6 lines are affected by NTMs and half of them exhibit negative AVEs of NTMs. These negative AVEs are spread over all HS sections (and HS2 sectors as shown in Table A .1 of the Online Appendix). Column (3) of Table 1 underlines the upward bias affecting the estimation of AVEs when NTM are constrained to be trade-reducing. As expected, the average AVE for each HS section is systematically higher than the average AVE obtained in column (2).
As highlighted with the frequency ratio, the share of HS6 lines subject to at least one NTM greatly differs across section and could therefore bias the average AVE calculated using all HS6 lines. To control for this bias, columns (4) and (5) of Table 1 report the average AVE computed only on HS6 lines on which at least one NTM is applied. Column (4) allows for the presence of market imperfections and trade-facilitating NTMs, while column (5) does not. As expected, the average AVE computed only on HS6 lines subject to a NTM is always higher in absolute value than the one based on all HS6 lines (with or without a NTM). However, the ranking of sections is now slightly different. AVEs of NTMs are still high for several agricultural products (especially for fats and oils, and live animals and animal products). However, the magnitude of the mean AVE is also notable for some manufactured products (e.g. machinery, electrical and video equipment). Furthermore, the difference between the AVEs computed using all HS6 lines and using only lines with a NTM cannot only be explained by the frequency of NTMs. For example, the frequency ratio of NTMs is relatively similar for pulp of wood, paper and printing (section X, ratio: 13.1%) and optical, photographic and medical instruments (section XVIII, ratio: 13.2%). However, the difference between the average AVE based on HS6 lines subject to a NTM and the one based on all HS6 lines is higher for optical, photographic and medical instruments than for pulp of wood, paper and printing (0.489 vs. 0.423 in the constrained estimation and 0.089 vs. 0.061 in the unconstrained one). This result is also observed at a more disaggregated level (see Table A .1 in the Online Appendix). This divergence of AVEs can be rationalized by the difference in the shares of trade reducing and facilitating NTMs across sections as well as in the magnitudes of the AVEs of these NTMs.
Insert Table 1 here The last 2 columns of Table 2 show the mean AVE for trade-reducing NTMs and that of trade-facilitating NTMs by HS section. We previously noticed that NTMs were more numerous on agricultural products. According to the second column of Table 2 , the AVEs of trade-reducing
NTMs on agricultural and food products are however not necessarily higher than the ones obtained on manufactured products. For example, the average AVE for mineral products ( 1.279) is slightly larger than the ones observed for vegetable products (1.047) or prepared foodstuffs, beverages, spirits and tobacco (1.130). The average positive AVE for the whole sample is equal to 1.111. AVEs of trade-facilitating NTMs are non positive, and because of the non-negative price constraint, they are included in the interval [-1;0]. Interestingly we observe that the magnitude of these AVEs is high in absolute value. The minimum in absolute value per section is equal to -0.803 (prepared foodstuffs, beverages, spirits and tobacco), and the maximum (-0.974) is reached for pearls, precious metals and stones. The mean over all sections is -0.840. Insert Table 2 here To sum up, our results suggest the presence of both trade reducing and facilitating NTMs, with substantial trade effects. Next, these AVEs of NTMs are further used to calculate the TRI and MTRI. Columns (2) and (7) show the MTRI and TRI estimates including all distortions based on the AVEs from the estimation constraining NTMs to be trade reducing. As expected, MTRIs and TRIs exhibit larger values than in columns (1) and (6) than those obtained using AVEs from the unconstrained estimation (see columns (4) and (9) others (FAO, 2003; Colen et al., 2012; . Intuitively, many countries with low tariff-MTRIs exhibit negative total MTRIs because small tariffs do not counterbalance negative NTM AVEs.
Insert Figures 2 and 3 here
Trade restrictiveness indices
Lastly, using more disaggregated results by country (see Table A .3 of the Online Appendix), we note that only 14 over 93 countries the MTRI values including overall protection based on unconstrained estimates are higher than the values based on tariffs only. If we abstract from production subsidies from the computation, the share is even smaller (only 9 countries over 93). 12 The analysis of the TRIs shows 45 countries with total TRIs smaller than the tariff-only TRI based on unconstrained estimates. These results show that positing protectionism NTMs strongly biases the evaluation of the restrictiveness of NTM trade policies.
As previously mentioned, if equation (4) provides a negative dT (cf. supra), then the TRI 24 level T cannot be computed using (5). The last columns of Tables 3 report the change in TRI, dT, i.e., the change in the index equivalent to the welfare impact of the policy interventions.
Country-level results suggest that for 27 over 93 countries, the change in TRI is negative ( (Tan, 1999) . Several LDC countries also exhibit negative dTRIs and these can be rationalized by opportunities created with the agri-food trade integration and policy reforms as noted earlier.
Insert Table 3 here
Conclusion
We extend the TRI approach to a small distorted open economy to account for market imperfections (externalities, asymmetric information) and NTM domestic regulations addressing them. Up to date, the presence of externalities and potential anti-protectionist effects of NTMs has been ignored in TRI application. Allowing for such occurrence, we derive the AVEs of NTMs, as well as the TRIs and MTRIs equivalent to all policy interventions (tariffs, NTMs and production subsidies). We show that in general the impact of NTMs on import demand is ambiguous depending on the relative strength of the import-facilitating effects of NTMs via a shift in import demand, and the protective effect of the same NTMs at the border. We then apply the approach to the UNCTAD-Comtrade database built by Kee et al. (2009 Although we show it is possible to rationalize and econometrically identify tradefacilitating effects of NTMs mitigating external effects and other market imperfections or having anti-protectionist effects on domestic suppliers, we do so using relatively simple NTM proxies. It would be interesting to refine these results and use more detailed NTM measures and focus on a subset of sectors for which we identify negative NTM AVEs. Nevertheless our results corroborate the trade-facilitating effects found in the literature for some products and countries (e.g. Disdier et al., 2008; Moenius, 2004) . The value added of our analysis is to formalize the possibility of anti-protectionist effects or external effects and their mitigation through regulations affecting quality of products and identify their effects on trade restrictiveness. Our analysis also extends the applicability of the TRI framework to more plausible market conditions and lets the data reveal unconstrained patterns. 6  8  10  12  14  16  18  20  22  24  26  28  30  32  34  36  38  40  42  44  46  48  50  52  54  56  58  60  62  64  66  68  70  72  74  76  78  80  82  84  86  88  90  92  94 
